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TORTS
by
Page Keeton *
I.

TORT LIABILITY OF AN OCCUPIER OF LAND TO AN EMPLOYEE
OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

In 1967 the Texas Supreme Court in Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry'
adopted the principle that an adequate warning to an independent contractor about dangerous conditions on the occupier's premises discharges
the occupier's duty of care to the contractor's employees. 2 The court's
holding was based on two underlying assumptions: (1) that an employee
may not recover for injuries sustained in the course of confronting a danger that he subjectively appreciates, either, because he has voluntarily assumed the risk, or because there is no duty to warn one about a danger that
he already appreciates; 3 (2) that an adequate warning given to the employee concerning a nonappreciated danger satisfies the occupier's duty of
care to such employee. 4 The court noted that in many situations it would
be impractical for the occupier to warn directly every employee of an independent contractor:
On many projects there are a number of independent contractors,
each employing scores of workmen. The identities of some of the
workmen will change from day to day. To impose the duty on the
owner or occupier of the premises to know and to warn every workman on the project of a dangerous condition would subject him to an
impossible burden. 5
In light of this "impossible burden," the court concluded that the duty to
warn employees6 of dangers on the premises should rest with the independent contractor.
Admittedly, in certain situations an occupier would not be found negligent for its failure to warn a contractor's employees even if its duty of care
was unlimited. The court in Delhi-Taylor could have taken a middle
ground by concluding that each case would be dealt with on an ad hoc
basis. Under this position, the question whether the occupier satisfied the
*

B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University; LL.D., Southern

Methodist University. W. Page Keeton Professor of Law in Torts, University of Texas.
1. 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
2. Id at 393.
3. Id at 392; see Halepeska v. CaUihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex.
1963). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 750-53 (4th
ed. 1971); Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 32 LA. L. REV. 108 (1961).

4. 416 S.W.2d at 390; see Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d 369, 373-74 (1936);
Keeton, PersonalInjuries Resultingfrom Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
629 (1952).
5. 416 S.W.2d at 394.
6. Id
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requirements of ordinary care in a particular situation would be one for
the jury to decide, except in those cases in which reasonable persons could
7
not disagree.
In any event, Delhi-Taylor is based on the premise that an invitee who
elects to take a chance by voluntarily and intentionally encountering an
appreciated danger ought not to recover, even when the defendant could
be regarded as negligent in creating or failing to eliminate the danger. The
right to exercise an informed choice is the extent of the protection to which
the invitee is entitled, and this is reasonably assured to employees of independent contractors when an adequate warning of dangers not otherwise
appreciated is given to a contractor's supervisor.
In the 1975 case of Farley v. MM Cattle Co. 8 the Texas Supreme Court
abolished voluntary assumption of the risk as a general defense in an action predicated on negligence. 9 That the court intended to assert that
under no circumstances may a defendant satisfy its obligations to another
by warning him of an unappreciated danger is unlikely, however.' 0 The
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff may be such as to
justify limiting the defendant's duty of care to providing the plaintiff with
an opportunity to make an informed decision about incurring a risk, as
when the claimant is a licensee rather than an invitee. II
In 1978 the supreme court in Parker v. HighlandPark, Inc. 12 abolished
the orthodox common law rule that an occupier had no duty to warn an
ordinary business invitee about an appreciated danger or a danger held to
be obvious as a matter of law.' 3 The common law rule had been based
largely on the notion that a right to an informed choice was the extent of
the protection to which an invitee was entitled.' 4 In commenting on
Parker in the 1979 Annual Survey, I made the following observation:
An employee of an independent contractor is a special kind of an
invitee, and it is doubtful whether the opinion of the supreme court in
Parker abolished the Delhi-Taylor "no-duty" rule. Even so, 5the issue
seems to be one that is worth reopening in light of Parker.'
The issue now has been reopened. During this survey period, the Waco
court of civil appeals concluded in Schley v. StructuralMetals, Inc. 16 that
the Delhi-Taylor doctrine, which states that an adequate warning to or ap7. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 4, 9 (1968). "The alterna-

tives here are either that there is no duty to do anything more than warn the independent
contractor in all cases or that the question is one of whether ordinary care requirements are
satisfied in the particular case by a warning to the independent contractor." Id at 10.
8. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).

9. Id at 758. The court stated, however, that its action would not affect "the current
status of the defense in strict liability cases and cases in which there is a knowing and express oral or written consent to the dangerous activity or condition." Id (emphasis added).
10. See id at 760 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
11.
12.
13.
14.

See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 1, 15-16 (1979).
565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).
Id at 517.
See Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d 310, 312-13 (Tex. 1962).

15. Keeton, supra note 11, at 17.
16. 595 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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preciation of danger by an independent contractor's supervisor discharges
an occupier's duty of care to the contractor's employees, has not survived
Parker.17 In Schley two employees of an independent contractor received
a severe electrical shock when the boom of a crane came into contact with
an electrical transmission line carrying 60,000 volts. One employee was
killed, and the other was seriously and permanently injured. The plaintiffs
sued the defendant occupier on negligence theories, alleging that the defendant had failed to warn them adequately about the dangers related to
the work and to the presence of the transmission line. In response to the
special issues submitted, the jury found negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to warn, but also found that such negligence was not a
proximate cause of the occurrence. 18 The jury also determined, however,
that the occupier was negligent in failing to request and agree to pay an
electric company to install the electric lines underground, and that this
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.' 9 Finally, the jury
found that the supervisory personnel of the independent contractor had
adequate knowledge of the danger prior to the occurrence. 20 On the basis
the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment
of the above findings,
2
against the plaintiff. '
The court of civil appeals, in reversing, concluded that Parker must necessarily be regarded as "setting aside" Delhi-Taylor.22 This conclusion was
based on the following propositions: (1) a contractor's employee is an invitee; (2) under Parker an invitee can recover against the occupier, even
though the invitee appreciates the danger, because the duty of care cannot
necessarily be satisfied by providing the invitee with a right to an informed
choice when there is a feasible way to eliminate the danger; (3) Delhi-Taylor states that an adequate warning to an independent contractor's supervisor will satisfy the occupier's duty of care and therefore the employee
could not recover even when unaware of the danger. The court found that
allowing the Delhi-Taylor rule to stand after Parker would lead to an inccongruous situation: "We cannot believe the Parker decision was intended
to create a set of rules whereby knowledge of a dangerous condition by
supervisory personnel of the injured workman would bar recovery, but
personal knowledge by the workman would not .... -23
The incongruity of the results envisaged by the court of civil appeals is
apparent, but Delhi-Taylor's reasoning remains sound today: To warn
each employee directly is impractical; therefore, if an occupier's duty of
care can be satisfied by an adequate warning, it can be satisfied by warning
a contractor's supervisor.24 Unquestionably, even if the duty of reasonable
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 582.
Id at 577.
Id.
Id at 578.
Id at 579.
Id at 582.
Id
Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. 1967).
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care is unlimited, the only possible negligence in some situations will be
that of failing to warn adequately about a danger. In other special situations, the duty of care may be limited to a warning. For example, if an
independent contractor is employed to eliminate a dangerous condition
and is adequately advised of the nature of the danger involved, the DelhiTaylor analysis remains valid. In any case in which failure to warn is
submitted as a ground of negligence, the reasoning of Delhi-Taylor continues to be applicable because it would impose an intolerable burden on the
occupier to issue a direct warning to every employee.
Moreover, the question still remains whether Parker applies or should
be applied to employees of independent contractors. A reasonable conclusion would be that the unlimited duty of ordinary care to the typical business guest-invitee does not apply to employees of independent contractors,
and that the limited duty of ordinary care to warn about nonobvious danger remains applicable. The contractor's employee has the supervisory
personnel, and ofttimes other means, to guard against accidents from obvious dangers on the premises. This safeguard may not be regarded, however, as a sufficient justification to relieve the occupier from liability for his
negligence in failing to eliminate a danger when there is evidence to show
that there was a feasible way to do so.
II. Loss

OF CONSORTIUM AND THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

In Copelin v. Reed Tool Co. 25 the court held that a deprived wife whose
husband was injured in the course of his employment and then collected
benefits under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act could recover damages for loss of consortium. 26 The fact that the husband's tort action was
barred by the Workers' Compensation Act was not considered controlling
because the court viewed the deprived wife's action for loss of consortium
as a separate and independent cause of action from that of the impaired
husband.2 7 Further, the wife's claim was not held barred because the
wife's recovery for loss of consortium would be her separate property,
28
rather than community property.
In Texas the right of either spouse to recover for negligent impairment
of consortium was not recognized until Whittlesey v. Miller.29 In that case
25. 596 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), afd on other grounds, 24
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 96 (Dec. 6, 1980).

26. 596 S.W.2d at 304.
27. 1d; see Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 44-45 (Fla. 1971); Thill v. Modem Erecting
Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865, 869 (1969); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667

(Tex. 1978); Peeples v. Sargent, 77 Wis. 2d 612, 253 N.W.2d 459, 471 (1977); W. PROSSER,
supra note 3, § 125, at 893.
28. 596 S.W.2d at 304; see Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. 1978); Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972). See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1975) (recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during
marriage is separate property, except for recovery for loss of earnings); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 49 n.149 (1972) (recovery of loss

of "comfort and society" of plaintiff-spouse is separate property).
29. 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
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the supreme court held not only that the deprived wife had a recovery, but
also that her independent cause of action was not extinguished by a release
by the impaired spouse of his cause of action against the tortfeasor. 30 The
court also said, however, that "the deprived spouse's suit for loss of consortium is considered to be derivative of the impaired spouse's negligence action to the extent that the tortfeasor's liability to the impaired spouse must
be established . ... ,,3 In other words, in order to subject a defendant to
liability to a deprived spouse, all the elements of a tort action by the impaired spouse must also exist. The same policy considerations that foreclose or diminish recovery on the part of the impaired spouse also
foreclose or diminish recovery on the part of the deprived spouse.
The dependency of a right to recovery for a relational injury, such as
loss of consortium, upon the existence and scope of the impaired spouse's
independent right to recovery is manifested in various areas of tort law.
For example, contributory negligence on the part of the impaired spouse
will bar or diminish recovery by the deprived spouse in the same manner
32
and to the same extent as it would recovery by the impaired spouse.
Likewise, if a husband injured in a traffic accident cannot recover against33a
host driver because of the guest statute, neither can the deprived wife.
In a logical extension of Whittesey the supreme court disagreed with the
reasoning and conclusions of the court of civil appeals in Copelin, but affirmed the court's holding that reversed and remanded the trial court's
grant of summary judgment. 34 The supreme court specifically held that a
deprived spouse has a cause of action for loss of consortium against a
tortfeasor only if at the time of the injury the impaired spouse has a cause
of action against that tortfeasor. 35 The common law rule regarding deriva30. Id at 669.
31. Id at 667. This statement was, of course, unnecessary to the decision and could
therefore be regarded as a dictum. The derivative nature of the cause of action, however,
has been generally recognized. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693, Comment e
(1977): "In order to subject a defendant to liability to a deprived spouse for illness or bodily
harm done to the impaired spouse, all of the elements of a tort action in the impaired spouse
must exist, including the tortious conduct of the tortfeasor .... " In other words, if the
impaired spouse has no cause of action, neither does the deprived spouse. This derivative
notion has been criticized. See'W. PROSSER, supra-note 3, § 125, at 892-93. This author
does not share this criticism, however.
32. See Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Colo. 474, 462 P.2d 589, 591-93 (1969);
Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529, 532 (1964). See also Keeton, supra note 11, at
18 (concluding on the basis of hiuttlesey that the deprived spouse's cause of action would be
diminished by the impaired spouse's contributory negligence under comparative negligence
rules).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. See 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 96, 97 (Dec. 6, 1980). The trial court had granted a motion
for summary judgment against the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's petition had alleged a cause of action based on an intentional injury of the employee as well as a
cause of action based on an accidental injury attributable to negligence. Because the imtaired spouse's cause of action in tort against his employer for an intentional injury inflicted
y the employer was not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act, the consortium action
was not barred. There being no indication that a finding of intentional conduct would be
precluded as a matter of law, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court. Id at
99.
35. Id. at 98.
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tive rights of recovery 36 is especially sound and applicable in the workers'
compensation situation, because any other result could lead to unmanageable and inordinately expensive tort litigation, requiring an employer to
bear as a cost of doing business substantial tort liability insurance costs
arising out of injuries to workers as well as the contemplated liability without fault costs under the Workers' Compensation Act.37 The benefits
awarded under the Workers' Compensation Act are intended not only for
the injured employee, but also for the employee's family. 38 If such benefits
are inadequate, the legislature has the power to expand them.
The result reached by the supreme court seems sound. The great weight
of authority throughout the country supports the conclusion that a deprived spouse has no recovery against an employer when the impaired
spouse's exclusive remedy is under a workers' compensation act. 39 A recent decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however,
reached a contrary result. 40 The Massachusetts court held that both a deprived spouse and the children of the injured employee could recover for
loss of consortium and companionship, even though they had accepted
benefits under the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Act.4 1 The
Massachusetts case is indeed unique in allowing a child to recover for the
loss of companionship and care of an injured parent. When there is
merely negligent injury of a parent, problems related to the size of damage
awards, especially damages for noneconomic losses, have resulted in the
universal rejection by courts throughout the United States of a cause of
action on behalf of children for the loss of companionship and care of an
impaired parent, even when there is no impediment to a recovery by the
42
parent.
III.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE STATE OF THE ART

A. Introductory Comments
It has often been asserted that if a machine, drug, or other product was
36. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.

37. The court of civil appeals recognized the benefits of the derivative action rule in the
workers' compensation area, but concluded that undesirable results were compelled because
of the recognition by the courts of the independence of the deprived spouse's cause of action
and the fact that the deprived spouse's recovery was separate property. 596 S.W.2d at 304.
The court said: "We are not unmindful of the disruptive effect this opinion may have upon
the administration of the Workers' Compensation Act; however, the result reached herein is
compelled by the authorities cited." Id

38. See Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. King & Co., 96 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1936, no writ).
39. See Ziegler v. United States Gypsum Co., 251 Iowa 714, 102 N.W.2d 152, 153-54
(1960); Ellis v. Fallert, 209 Or. 406, 307;.2d 283, 286 (1957).
40. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).

41. Id at 702-03.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 707A (1977): "One who by reason of his
tortious conduct is liable to a parent for illness or other bodily harm is not liable to a minor
child for resulting loss of parental support and care." The comment to this section states:
"The only apparent distinctions are that the harm to the interest of the minor child is of less
significance in this situation and the likelihood of duplication or overlap of recovery would
be substantially greater." Id Comment a.

19811

TORTS

designed or constructed by a producer or maker in conformity with the
"state of the art" at the time possession was surrendered, then either (1) the
product should not be regarded as defective in such a manner as to be
unreasonably dangerous, or (2) if defective, then the maker or producer
should be excused. 43 The recent supreme court case of Bailey v. Boatland
of Houston, Inc. 44is among the dozen most important supreme court opinions on products liability due to its detailed discussion of the term "state of
the art." In Boatland the plaintiffs were the widow and children of Bailey,
who was killed in a boating accident. The boat, which was purchased in
1973, had struck a submerged tree stump, and Bailey was thrown into the
water. With its motor still running, the boat turned sharply and circled
back toward the stump. Bailey was killed by a propeller. One of the alleged defects of design was the failure -to incorporate a safety device
known as a "kill switch," an automatic cut-off system that would cause the
boat's motor to shut off automatically when the driver is propelled away
from his position at the steering wheel. Evidence regarding this device was
introduced through the testimony of an inventor who began developing a
kill switch in 1972. He made an application for a patent on this type of kill
switch in January 1973. According to his testimony, the invention required no breakthrough in scientific knowledge and was relatively simple. 45 The inventor also testified that such a device had been in use on
racing boats for thirty years.4 6 Further evidence was introduced by the
defendant over the objection of the plaintiffs to the effect that kill switches
were not commercially available to Boatland, the assembler and retailer of
the boat in question. 47 At trial the jury found that the product was not
defective as designed. 48 Its finding was no doubt influenced by the evidence introduced by the defendant as to the unavailability of any kind of
kill switches.
The court of civil appeals, relying in part on a consumer-contemplation
43. See Karasik, "State of the Art or Science'" Is It a Defense to ProductsLiability?,60
ILL. B.J. 348, 350-51 (1972); O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State ofthe Art. Terminology, PracticeandReform, II AKRON L. REV. 627, 631 (1978); Raleigh, The "State of the Art"
in ProductLiability. A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4 OHIo N.L. REV. 249, 252-64 (1977).

State legislatures have approached the state of the art defense in two ways, either as a
complete defense or as a rebuttable presumption. The Indiana product liability law, for
example, provides as a defense to an action for physical harm caused by the plan or design
of a product, that the methods, standards, or techniques of designing and manufacturing the
product were prepared and applied in conformity with the generally recognized state of the
art at the time of the manufacture or design. IND. CODE § 34-4-20A-4(b)(4) (Supp. 1980).
The Kentucky statute, on the other hand, provides that, until rebutted by a preponderance
of the evidence, the product is presumed not defective if the design, methods of manufac-

ture, and testing conformed to the generally recognized and prevailing standards of the state
of the art in existence at the time the design was prepared and the product was manufactured. KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310 (1980).
44. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 566 (July 31, 1980).

45. Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[Ist Dist.] 1979), rev'd, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.566 (July 31, 1980). This testimony would seem to

indicate that the patent applied for would not be a valid one.
46. 585 S.W.2d at 807.
47. Id at 808.
48. Id at 807.
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test as to when a product is defective, 49 held that such state of the art evidence as to the availability of kill switches when Boatland assembled and
sold the boat was irrelevant and reversed the trial court's judgment for the
defendant.50 The supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals and
affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that state of the art evidence
relating to technical and scientific knowledge at the time a product is
designed is relevant to the issue of the feasibility of minimizing or eliminating a risk or hazard related to the foreseeable uses of a product.5 '
Boatland should prove helpful in the resolution of various issues and
problems related to state of the art. For this reason, I am using the case as
an occasion to comment on some of the problems and ambiguities related
to the use of the term "state of the art."
The term "state of the art" is sometimes used when the problem or accident is related to a flaw in a product, such as trichinosis in pork or serum
hepatitis in blood, rather than a design hazard. The argument runs that
the undiscoverability of the "flaw," in light of the state of the art at the
time, should excuse liability.5 2 In reality, this is an argument against strict
liability for defects in products and a return to something akin to liability
based on negligence. The burden of proof is simply shifted from the plaintiff to prove negligence to the defendant to prove utmost care.
State of the art has more often been used as a reason for concluding that
there should be no liability for a design hazard.5 3 Even when so limited,
two basic ambiguities have been involved in the various arguments put
forward: first, the term has been used for the purpose of resolving entirely
different issues or problems; secondly, it has been used with quite different
meanings. The result of these ambiguities is that in each instance that state
of the art is used, the precise meaning and purpose of the term must be
identified in order to evaluate the soundness of the argument or proposition.
In order to identify the various ways in which the expression is used, it is
necessary to begin with a clear understanding of the test or standard for
ascertaining when a product as designed is defective in such a way as to
make it "unreasonably dangerous." In Turner v. GeneralMotors Corp. 54
the supreme court approved a jury charge that defined "defectively
designed" as meaning: "a product that is unreasonably dangerous as
designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk
involved in its use."'55 Prior to Turner, it was generally thought that the
49. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1979).
50. 585 S.W.2d at 811. Judgment for the defendant had been entered based in part on

the jury's finding that the boat was not defective. Id at 807.
51' 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 570.

52. Huebner v. Hunter Packing Co., 59 I1. App. 3d 563, 375 N.E.2d 873, 877 (1978)
(trichinosis in pork); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392, 395, 397
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), afd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975) (serum hepatitis from a
blood transfusion).

53. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
54. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).

55. Id at 847 n.1.
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supreme court meant to give a claimant an opportunity to prove a design
defect in one of two alternative ways: (1) by proving that the product as
designed was more dangerous than would be contemplated by the ordinary purchaser; or (2) by proving that a reasonable seller with knowledge
of the danger that existed would not have sold the product.5 6 The supreme
court perceptively concluded that there were a variety of difficulties 57 with
this bifurcated approach and disapproved its use in the charge to the
jury.5 8 The court also stated that, for practical reasons, it would be
counterproductive to attempt to set forth for the jury the various factors
related to danger on the one hand and utility on the other. 59 This statement, however, does not alter the fact that appellate judges and trial and
appellate advocates must understand which factors are significant regarding issues of admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence. Trial advocates
are left with the responsibility of illuminating the otherwise vague and
nebulous charge approved in Turner.
My position is that the supreme court in Turner actually held that a
product is unreasonably dangerous, and therefore defective, if a reasonable person would conclude that the danger in fact, whether foreseeable or
not, outweighs the utility of the product. There are three primary reasons
for so concluding: (1) the harmful consequences in fact from intended and
reasonably foreseeable uses outweigh the benefits; 60 (2) although the
harmful consequences do not exceed the benefits, alternative products are
available that serve the same needs or desires with less risk of harm; (3)
although the harmful consequences do not outweigh the benefits, there was
or is a 6feasible way to design the product with less harmful consequences. '
56. See Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1974). I describe these
two tests succinctly by referring to the first as the "consumer contemplation" test and the
second as the "hindsight negligence" test. The latter simply hypothesizes knowledge on the
part of the seller of the dangerousness of the product and requires a jury finding whether,
under such a state of affairs, the seller would have been negligent. The principal weakness
of the hindsight ne ligence test is that it fails to direct attention to the fact that, in evaluating
conduct, or in evaluating the propriety of a particular design, it is necessary to weigh perceivable danger (or danger in fact, as the case may be) with the utility of the design. See
Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The TechnologicalExpert in ProductsLiability Litigation, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1303, 1305-09 (1974); Keeton, ProductsLiability-DesignHazards

and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUM. L. REV. 293, 306 (1979).
57, These included doubts as to whether jurors would know what the expectations of an
ordinary consumer would be, or whether they would apply any standard except their own
experience. 584 S.W.2d at 851.
58. Id.

59. Id at 848-49.
60. "Benefits" refers to the wants, desires, and human needs that are served by the product. The benefits served by a prescription drug, for example, would be lives saved, disabling
injuries prevented, illnesses cured, and pain alleviated. Often a prescription drug or vaccine
is withdrawn from use, either voluntarily or under coercion from a federal agency, because
the harmful side effects outweigh the benefits derived from the use of the drug or vaccine.
The fact that the product was withdrawn is relevant, if not conclusive, that the harm was
found to have outweighed the benefits. See Parke, Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390,
1398-99 (8th Cir. 1969).
61. See Keeton, supra note 56, at 307, 314; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973).
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Assuming the validity of what has just been said about the meaning of a
design defect, conformity to state of the art has been utilized in four different ways in an effort to relieve the manufacturer from liability for physical
harm attributable to a design hazard.
B.

State of the Art as the Customary Way

It has often been argued that if a product were designed in conformity
with the state of the art, in the sense of the customary way or practice of
designing such a product, 62 then the product should not be regarded as
defective and unreasonably dangerous. With rare exceptions, the courts
have held that industry custom, at the time a product was designed and
sold, is not conclusive either on a negligence theory or on a theory of strict
liability in tort. 63 This usage was noted in Boatland.64 The Texas
Supreme Court clearly has adopted this position. In Gonzales v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co. 65 a tractor was designed with a step to assist the user in getting
into the rider's seat. The problem with the step was that it became muddy
when the tractor was used in wet weather. The step was the only way the
user had to get on and off the tractor. The plaintiff fell when getting off the
tractor and injured his back. At trial, the defendant introduced evidence
that the tractor design was consistent with prevailing industry custom. Expert testimony however, indicated that for about the same cost, and without impairment of the use of the tractor, a retractable step could have been
designed to eliminate the danger. 66 Jury findings of both product defect
and negligence were upheld on the basis of the testimony adduced by the
67
plaintiff's expert.
Courts have generally held that the prevailing industry custom in designing a product is relevant and admissible on both theories of negligence
and strict liability to show that an industry-wide value judgment had been
made weighing known or reasonably foreseeable dangers against the product's utility. 68 Some language in Boatland, however, may imply that in62. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 49 (1963), quoted in Raleigh,
supra note 43, at 258, defines state of the art as "contemporaneous practical skill in performance exercised by the designers of products."
63. See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][i]
(1980).

64. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 569. The court stated:
An offer of evidence of the defendant's compliance with custom to rebut evi-

dence of its negligence has been described as the "state of the art defense."...
In this connection, it is argued that the state of the art is equivalent to industry
custom and is relevant only to the issue of the defendant's negligence and
irrelevant to a strict liability theory of recovery.
In our view, "custom" is distinguishable from "state of the art."
Id (citation omitted).
65. 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
66. Id at 871.
67. Id
68. See Poland v. Beaird-Poulan, 483 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (W.D. La. 1980); Perkins v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 482 F. Supp. 1347, 1351-53 (W.D. La. 1980); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150 (N.J. 1979).
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dustry custom is inadmissible evidence under a theory of strict liability.
Custom is relevant on the issue of negligence simply because it can be
inferred that the industry has made some effort to weigh reasonably foreseeable dangers against utility, including the feasibility of safer alternatives. 70 Industry custom is not conclusive, however, because price
competition may lower standards of safety below acceptable levels. The
same point can be made about product defect and custom. But a significant difference exists that gives rise to an argument that custom is inadmissible on a theory of strict liability. Danger in fact accompanying the use of
a product, not reasonably foreseeable danger, is weighed against product
utility to determine if a product is defectively designed. 7' This objective
test for danger distinguishes strict liability from negligence. Because custom is necessarily based on an industry's perception of the danger relative
to the available technology rather than the danger in fact, the industry's
value judgment cannot be regarded as equally reliable on the issue of
product defect as on the issue of negligence. Because the foreseeability of
the danger or its extent is often an issue at trial, however, the preferable
approach is to admit the evidence for whatever value it has. Advocates
can point out its unreliability on the issue of product defect, but the evidence is relevant to the extent that the danger may have been perceived by
the industry.

C. State of the Art as Meaning the Feasibilityof Minimizing Danger
The state of the art is frequently used in products liability litigation, and
was so used in Boatland,72 to mean that which is feasible by way of minimizing danger. 73 This concept is critically important in the products liabilact defined it as the
ity treatment of design hazards. Nebraska's "reform"
74
best technology reasonably available at the time.
When this usage is employed by the defendant, the contention is that, at
the time the product was made and designed, the danger in fact of the
product was not reducible by any feasible means, given the technical and
scientific knowledge that was then reasonably available to the designer.
69. The Boatland court held that " 'custom' is distinguishable from 'state of the art.'

The state of the art with respect to a particular product refers to the technological environment at the time of its manufacture. .

.

. Evidence of this nature is important in determin-

ing whether a safer design was feasible." 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 569. The inference is that
evidence of industry custom is inadmissible.

70. See O'Donnell, supra note 43, at 630-35 (1977); Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict
Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1, 34-53 (1976).
71. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847-51 (Tex. 1979).

72. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 569.
73. See, e.g., Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 764-66 (D.N.D. 1972);

Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 I11.App. 3d 635;-340 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 182 (Supp. 1978); see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 1, 12 (1980); cf. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § 106(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2998 (1979) (defining "state of the art" as

"the safety, technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture.").
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The feasibility of minimizing danger is an issue in cases in which the danger in fact of a product does not outweigh the benefits, but the argument is
made by the claimant that the danger does outweigh the utility because a
feasible way existed to avoid much of the danger without seriously impairing the benefits. The contention may be either (1) that it was feasible to
design a safer product when the product was designed and sold by utilizing
technology then known and available or (2) that it became feasible to do so
after the product was sold as a result of a scientific breakthrough or the
acquisition of new knowledge or technical skill.
There is no known authority to support the position that a product is
defectively designed solely because a subsequent scientific discovery has
resulted in a safety improvement in later models. Bell Helicopter Co. v.
Bradshaw,75 however, applies this rationale to the sale of used products.
In Bradshaw a Bell helicopter crashed after its tail rotor blade broke during flight. The helicopter was equipped with the 102 rotor blade system,
the ultimate in existing technology in 1961, when the helicopter was
designed and sold. 76 Several years after the sale of this helicopter, Bell
developed a new and safer type of rotor blade system that had a much
longer service life, was less susceptible to damage from misuse, and did not
require the same frequency of inspections. Because the rotor blades were
not interchangeable, use of the new and safer system on used helicopters
required an alteration in design at a significant cost. 77 After Bell had developed the new and safer rotor blade system, an authorized Bell service
station purchased the used helicopter in 1969 and resold it without altering
the system. The appellate court affirmed the trial court judgment against
the defendant, citing as one reason the continued use of the old 102 system
at the time it left the Bell service station.78 Because a safer rotor blade
system was then available, the court found that the helicopter sold by Bell
was defective as a matter of law. 79 This holding requires a manufacturer
of a product, such as an automobile, who discovers a way to improve the
safety of his product either (1) to include in the price of the new product
the cost of redesigning all used products that come into the possession of
its dealers, or (2) to bear the costs of accidents that result from not redesigning such products.
Notwithstanding the holding in Bradshaw, the courts have universally
held that the feasibility of designing a safer product must be determined
on the basis of the level of pertinent scientific and technical knowledge
existing at the time a product is designed.80 An alternative design that was
75. 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. Id. at 526-28.
77. Id
78. Id at 539.
79. Id at 530-32. I am not commenting on the merits of Bradshaw and its various
holdings primarily because I was counsel for Bell in its application for a writ of error.
80. See Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Anderson v. Heron
Eng'r Co., 604 P.2d 674 (Colo. App. 1979); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530,
540 (N.D. 1977); Sobota, Product Feasibility Reform Proposals. The State of the Art Defense,
43 ALB. L. REV. 941, 950 (1979).
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not utilized is to be considered as feasible when a reasonable person would
conclude that the magnitude of the danger that could have been avoided
by such alternative design, by utilizing the scientific knowledge or technology reasonably available to the defendant, outweighed the financial costs
of guarding against such dangers plus anyimpairment of the benefits and
any new risk or danger created by the alternative design. The courts have
repeatedly said that a manufacturer is not required to make a product as
safe as would be technologically possible; however, technological impossibility of a safer design at the time a product is designed is conclusive that
the product is not defective. 8'
The courts have not always consistently allocated the burden of proof.
In Barker v. LullEngineering Co. 82 the California Supreme Court held that
a product is to be regarded as defectively designed in a particular aspect "if
the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his injury
and the defendant fails to prove . . . that on balance the benefits of the
83
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design."
The great majority of courts, however, have placed the burden of proof on
the claimant. To shift this burden to the defendant comes perilously close
to holding the defendant liable for all harm proximately caused by design
hazards, and arguably burdens those who make and sell products with an
excessive allocation of the costs of accidents, especially at a 84time when
there is so much effort to bring about legislative intervention.
In Boatland the trial court held that the failure to design the boat with 85a
kill switch involved the issue of the feasibility of minimizing the risks.
The evidence on the part of the claimant that kill switches had been in use
on racing boats was quite obviously relevant to the issue of the feasibility
of using kill switches in all motor boats. It appears close to being convincing. The Texas Supreme Court, however, held that evidence regarding the
unavailability of kill switches to the defendant was at least some evidence
of lack of feasibility. 86 In essence, it seems to be nothing more than evidence that motor boats are universally, and therefore customarily,
designed without kill switches. As stated heretofore, however, custom is
generally admissible as some evidence that the product's risk and utility
have been properly weighed by the industry,8 7 and therefore perhaps some
81. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.566, 570 n.3 (July 31, 1980);
2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, § 16A[4][i].
82. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
83. 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
84. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 74; Epstein, Products Liability.The Searchfor the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978); Twerski & Weinstein, A
Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221
(1979).
85. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 568.
86. Id.at 570. This opinion, insofar as it holds that certain evidence of the state of the
art is admissible on the issue of defectiveness in product design cases, is not intended to
suggest that such evidence constitutes an affirmative defense, as do misuse and assumption
of the risk. Id at 570 n.3; see Murray, The State ofthe Art Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 651-52, 672-74 (1974).
87. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. On rehearing in Turner, two justices
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evidence of lack of feasibility to use the kill switch on boats generally.88
If, as I think was true, under the charge to the jury in Boatlanda product
could be regarded as defective only if it was more dangerous than would
have been contemplated by an ordinary consumer,8 9 then a jury finding
that the product was not defective is understandable. The ordinary purchaser of a fishing boat does not expect anything safer than that which is
customarily made and sold. 90
D. State of the Art as That Which is Feasible at a Given Time
State of the art is often used to describe the level of technology existing
at a specific time and place. 9 1 In a scientific, nonlegal context, state of the
art refers to "the level of pertinent scientific, technical knowledge existing
at the time," encompassing "all available data pertinent to the problem,
regardless of its source," including information from other disciplines and
other industries, or in research laboratories "so long as it is in published
form and accessible to research workers through technical libraries or sim'92
ilar sources."
A product should be regarded as defectively designed for failure to use a
safer design if it is economically feasible to do so on the basis of available
scientific methods, whether or not such knowledge is discoverable in the
exercise of utmost care. Under this approach, in determining the issue of
product defect no consideration should be given to the impracticability of
discovering what may have been a known scientific fact. Therefore, in
Boatland,the question is whether the feasibility of making boats with kill
switches should be judged on the basis of 411 known scientific data or only
on data knowable to manufacturers in the exercise of ordinary care. Feasibility of alternative designs appears to have been based upon the reasonable discoverability of the technological data.
took issue with the majority, their position being that the evidence that was admitted was
concurring in
only evidence of an industry practice. 584 S.W.2d at 853-55 (Campbell, J.,
part, dissenting in part). I agree that this is so, but I have previously taken the position that
custom is admissible as some indication of the lack of feasibility to do better. I doubt if
Boat/and was tried to the jury on the proper theory in that it was probably submitted on the
basis of a consumer contemplation test. This evidence would be quite convincing on the
basis of such a test, because purchasers could not expect any more safety than they were
generally receiving and because the danger was obvious.
88. See 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 568.
89. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 567 n.2; see Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 38 (1973).
90. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976), wherein the
court said:
State-of-art evidence helps to determine the expectation of the ordinary consumer. A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety features
which are incorporated in automobiles made today. The same expectation
applies to airplanes. Plaintiffs have not shown that the ordinary consumer
would expect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in
1970.
Id at 447.
91. See I L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, § 6.05115] (1975).
92. Id.
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E. State of the Art as Meaning the Technological and Economic
Feasibility of Discovering a Risk or Hazard That
Exists in a Product
There is a fourth and final way that the term state of the art is used to
limit the liability of a producer. The fact that a hazard or risk related to
the way a product is designed is not discoverable under existing technology in the exercise of utmost or reasonable care is often urged as an excuse. This reasoning is usually asserted by way of an affirmative defense
rather than by way of asserting that the product is not defective. In fact,
this defensive theory has not been limited to design hazards but has also
been utilized for flaws or impurities in products, such as trichinosis in
93
pork.
The 1960s witnessed a confusing series of cases over the risk of contracting lung cancer from smoking cigarettes. 94 Several issues were involved, one of which was the scientific undiscoverability of the risk or
danger of contracting lung cancer from smoking. 95 Scientific undiscoverability of a risk or hazard would seem to be completely irrelevant on the
issue of whether a product is defective in the sense that its danger outweighs its benefits. If inability to discover a risk or hazard related to product design were a defense, then, as a substantive matter, negligence
becomes the basis for recovery. The only practical difference-between recovery on a negligence theory and recovery under strict liability is a
change in the burden of proof. The defendant under so-called strict liability is required to prove both that reasonable or utmost care was exercised
and that the risk was not discoverable.
The issue of the undiscoverability of the risk has occasionally arisen
with respect to cases involving prescription drugs and vaccines, most recently in the controversy surrounding the synthetic hormone DES. In
Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories,96 a case involving an addictive pain
killing drug, the Texas Supreme Court stated in a dictum that "some products, though manufactured as designed and intended, are so dangerous in
fact that the manufacturer should be liable for resulting harm though he
did not and could not have known of the danger at the time of marketing.,, 97 Likewise, Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co. 9 8 held "that a drug
93. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
94. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (testimony on
scientific knowledge was admissible); Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir.
1964) (scientific unknowability is a defense); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317
F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (scientific unknowability regarded as a defense under Louisiana law);
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (scientific
unknowability is not a defense if the risk or hazard in the product constituted a breach of
warranty); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963) (scientific
unknowability of the risk of lung cancer is irrelevant). See generally Wegman, Cigarettes
and Health-A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678 (1966).
95. See note 94 supra.
96. 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
97. Id at 432.
98. 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969). Tinnerholm involved a four-in-one vaccine for whoop-
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that its products will not prove to be unreason-

ably dangerous." 99 Regardless of how this issue is ultimately resolved in

Texas and elsewhere, there is nothing inconsistent about refusing to recognize undiscoverability of danger as a bar to liability while at the same time
holding that "feasibility of alternative designs" must be based on the current state of technology at the time the product was made and designed.
IV.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THEORIES OF RECOVERY

In former survey articles on torts, I have observed that products liability
law has become unnecessarily complex, primarily because recovery for a
particular kind of loss by a particular type of person may often be obtained
under three separate theories: negligence, strict liability in tort, and strict
liability for breach of warranty. I°° The first of these theories in point of
time was the warranty theory,' 0 ' the second was negligence, 10 2 and the
third was strict liability in tort. 10 3 My position has been that it is unnecessary and counterproductive to provide three theories of recovery for a particular kind of loss, such as personal injury, damage to tangible property
other than the defective product itself, damage to the defective product
itself, or intangible economic losses. 1°4 Much of the complexity of products liability law could be eliminated by adopting, through court decisions
and legislation, a single theory of recovery for each particular kind of loss
as opposed to permitting a claimant to rely on two or three theories for the
same loss. Of course, the courts cannot rescind constitutionally enacted
legislation.
The legal obligations of an actor to one who is not a party to a contract,
or an intended beneficiary of one of the parties to a contract, have histori10 5
cally been regarded as tortious in nature rather than as contractual.
Preserving this distinction is important. To regard something as a contractual obligation that does not result from a promise or a representation
made to a party to a bargaining transaction or such party's intended beneficiary confuses the bases on which the respective obligations rest. Contractual liability exists to prevent the frustration of expectations created by
promises and representations made by one party in a bargaining transacing cough, diphtheria, tetanus, and polio. The vaccine caused a high fever in a small percentage of children, leaving them permanently handicapped, both physically and mentally.
99. Id at 53.
100. Keeton, supra note 74, at 3-4; Keeton, supra note 11, at I n.2; Keeton, Torts,Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 1 (1978).
101. See I S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES 368-69 (2d ed. 1924); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 122 (1943). The leading
case is perhaps Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
102. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Donaue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.); C. MILLER & P. LOVELL, PRODUCT LIABILITY
71-75 (1977).
103. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
104. Keeton, supra note 11, at 1.
105. Id at 9-15.
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tion to another. 0 6 Warranty liability, including the implied warranty of
merchantability, has historically been based on the notion that the seller
made an implied representation that the product being sold was reasonably fit for its intended and perhaps reasonably foreseeable use. 10 7 Tort
liability on the other hand is based on the notion that an actor has certain
duties to avoid harm that may result from the dangerousness of his conduct. 10 8 These duties are completely independent of any promises and
representations made to those with whom the actor might have negotiated
a contract. 109
The mere fact that the framers of the Uniform Commercial Code provided that a purchaser, and one who can justifiably be regarded as an intended beneficiary, can recover for physical injuries as consequential
damages when a purchaser has been frustrated in his expectations about
the product 0 Odoes not mean that the Code must be interpreted to allow
recovery on a warranty theory to everyone who is foreseeably injured by a
defective product. In actuality, the remaining provisions of the Code indicate that the contrary was intended.
The Code explicitly provides that a buyer can recover as an element of
his damages any losses resulting from personal injuries attributable to a
defect that constitutes a breach of warranty.'' Such damages are regarded as consequentiaL Breach of warranty to the claimant, however,
does not arise from the personal injury; rather, it results from the selling of
a defective product, the direct damage measured by the difference between
the value of12 what the claimant received and the value of what he bargained for."
The Uniform Commerical Code was drafted at a time when strict liability in tort had not fully developed. There was, therefore, a pressure to
recognize some "users" as third-party beneficiaries, although they would
not have been regarded as third-party beneficiaries or intended beneficiaries under sound principles of contract law. The framers responded by
3
drafting several versions from which legislators could make a selection," 1
but the framers did not intend to extend liability to all bystanders and all
106. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1-2 (1963). The main purpose of contract law
is the realization of reasonable expectations induced by promises.
107. R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 235-36 (1970); see Krause v. Sud-Aviation, Soc.
Nat. de Const. Aero., 301 F. Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aft'd, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir.

1969), in which the court stated: "A warranty is in essence a promise. We think it is reasonable for a passenger in an aircraft to proceed on the assumption that the manufacturer has
made the plane, if not perfectly, at least in such a way that its ordinary use will not prove
harmful."
108. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 1, at 4-7.
109. Id.
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). This section
was designed to prescribe who can sue if a product fails to conform to the warranty or
warranties made. The purpose of this section is to give certain beneficiaries the benefit of
the same warranty that the buyer received in the contract of sale.
111. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
112. Id § 2.714.
113. See U.C.C. § 2-318.
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users. The Texas Legislature chose to leave to the courts the issue of who
other than the purchaser could recover on a warranty theory." 4 The
Texas Supreme Court was thus free to say that warranty liability extends
to precisely the same persons as does strict liability in tort, to all those to
whom harm is likely to occur from a defect." 15 The supreme court so held
in Garcia v. Texas Instruments,Inc. ,116 with which I respectfully disagree.
The court could have held otherwise, and limited more narrowly contract
liability and warranty liability to a purchaser and members of the purchaser's household.
While moving cartons of acid the claimant in Garcia tripped and fell,
breaking a glass container, and as a result, received severe acid burns. Approximately three years and eight months after the accident, Garcia instituted suit against the producer of the acid, alleging a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability and further alleging that as an employee of
the purchaser, he was a third-party beneficiary. The trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant producer was affirmed by the
court of civil appeals."17 The supreme court reversed and remanded,
holding that "privity of contract is not a requirement for a Uniform Commercial Code implied warranty action for personal injuries."18 The court
ruled that Garcia's recovery was governed entirely by the Uniform Commercial Code, including its four-year statute of limitations." 19
In Garcia the claimant was a user of the product, but the language of the
court seems to indicate that a bystander could also recover on a warranty
theory. Thus, the classes of persons who can sue for personal injuries
under strict tort liability and warranty liability now seem to be coextensive
in Texas. The claimant can select as a basis for recovery either warranty
rules, and principles primarily developed to protect purchasers from intangible economic losses resulting from a frustration of expectations about the
product, or strict liability rules, and principles primarily developed to
guard against the dangerousness of the product. Does any injured person's
need to receive compensation justify the creation of this complexity by giving a claimant optional theories in order to overcome legislative roadblocks to recovery on one of the theories?
In support of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Garcia, it is arguable that if a purchaser and an intended beneficiary, such as a member of
the purchaser's household, can recover for personal injuries on a warranty
theory, then there is no sound reason for not allowing a bystander, and
also any user, to recover on a warranty theory. But the warranty theory is,
114. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
115. See generally Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969); see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 3, 8 (1970).

116.
Tyler).
117.
1980).
118.
119.

24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127 (Dec. 17, 1980), rev'g 598 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.598 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), rev'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127 (Dec. 17,
24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127, 134 (Dec. 17, 1980).
Id
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as stated earlier, a representational theory, based on the notion that the
purchaser's expectations about the product were frustrated by a misrepresentation.
Although two theories of recovery are arguably available, it would be
preferable if the Uniform Commercial Code were amended so as to eliminate personal injury recovery from the warranty action. By extending warranty liability to protect bystanders and all users, the Texas Supreme
Court has in my judgment increased rather than lessened the complexity of
litigation. Even if this result were justified in order to avoid the shorter
statute of limitations applicable to tort actions, I doubt that the benefits
gained outweigh the social costs that stem from the increasing complexity
that necessarily results.

